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Abstract 
With the tremendous increase in the number of smart phones, app stores 
have been overwhelmed with applications requiring geo-location access to 
provide their users better services through personalization. Revealing a user’s 
location to these third-party apps, no matter at what frequency, is a severe 
privacy breach which can have unpleasant social consequences. In order to 
prevent inference attacks derived from geo-location data, a number of location 
obfuscation techniques have been proposed in the literature. However, none 
of them provides any objective measure of privacy guarantee. Some work has 
been done to define differential privacy for geo-location data in the form of geo- 
indistinguishability with l privacy guarantee. These techniques do not utilize 
any prior background information about the Points of Interest (PoI s) of a user 
and apply Laplacian noise to perturb all the location coordinates. Intuitively, 
the utility of such a mechanism can be improved if the noise distribution is 
derived after considering some prior information about PoI s. 
 
In this paper, we apply the standard definition of differential privacy on 
geo-location data. We use first principles to model various privacy and utility 
constraints, prior background information available about the PoI s (distribu- 
-tion of PoI locations in a 1D plane) and the granularity of the input required 
by different types of apps, to produce a more accurate and a utility maxi- 
mizing differentially private algorithm for geo-location data at the OS level. We 
investigate this for a category of apps and for some specific scenarios. This will 
also help us to verify that whether Laplacian noise is still the optimal 
perturbation when we have such prior information. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the years, several mobile phone services are becoming dependent on user’s location to 
provide a better experience, be it a dating app, restaurant search, nearby gas stations lookup and 
what not.  All these services require a user to surrender her location (mostly   exact coordinates) 
to derive accurate results. With the increasing popularity of social networks, extracting auxiliary 
information about an individual has become easier than ever before.  Both factors have increased 
the likelihood of inference attacks on the users, which can have unpleasant social consequences. 
Therefore, revealing user’s location, no matter at what frequency, is a severe privacy breach. 
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The criticality of geo-location data can be estimated by the news pieces reporting that   the 
Egyptian government used to locate and imprison users of Grindr–a gay dating app [4]. Grindr 
uses geo-location of its users to provide them a perfect match in their vicinity.       Most of the 
users have submitted their stats such as body weight, height, eye color, ethnicity, preferences, on-
prep (AIDS status), extra information etc.  while creating a profile.  Even half of these values 
along with their geo-location, can be used to derive inferences uniquely identifying a user. 
[6] has reported social relationship leakage of a user through applications which use GPS   
data. Several inferences can be deduced by observing social relationships of an individual 
which he might not want to disclose. 
Tracking location coordinates or identifying PoI s of an individual, can characterize his 
mobility and can infer sensible information such as hobbies, political, religious interests or 
even potential diseases [7].  All these studies provide enough motivation for the research 
community to find a solution to protect geo-location privacy. 
Although geo-indistinguishability presents various appealing aspects, it has the problem 
of treating space in a uniform way, imposing the addition of Laplace noise everywhere on 
the map [3]. This assumption is too strict and can affect the utility of the service. A Laplace-
based obfuscation mechanism satisfying this privacy notion works well in the case where no 
prior information is available. However, most of the apps which require geo-location as 
input, are conditioned with the prior of the destination or the PoI s, in general. 
In this paper, we would try to investigate that whether the choice of using Laplacian noise          
to perturb geo-data is optimal in the scenarios where prior information about user’s PoIs is 
available.  Intuitively, availability of this information will improve the utility of the differential   
private mechanism but must be conditioned with some more constraints.  In the next section, we 
discuss the related work done in this direction. In section 3, we clearly define the problem 
statement we counter in this paper.  Section 4 discusses our proposal and the contribution towards 
the solution of this problem. In section 5 and 6, we present our results and the future trajectory of 
our work, respectively. In section 7, we conclude our findings.  After listing the references, 
appendix A and B provide the mathematical solution of our constraints. 
 
2 Related Work 
Most of the hand-held devices provide three options of allowing location access to the installed     
apps, namely– Always, While using and Never. One can easily predict the harm which can be 
caused when this permission is granted Always.  On the other hand, we still want to use the 
service from the app, so not allowing this permission by selecting Never is not a valid choice.  In 
such a situation, While using option appears appropriate but can still be used by an attacker to 
track the trajectory of a user. Intuitively, it is better to trust the OS which can sanitize the geo-
location data before supplying it as an input to the app. 
 
Literature proposes different ideas to perturb geo-location data. [10] proposes the idea of 
spatial and temporal cloaking which uses k –anonymity, l –diversity and p–sensitivity. Other 
spatial obfuscation mechanisms proposed in [11, 12] reduce the precision of the location 
infor- mation before supplying it to the service. Most of these techniques are not robust and 
are also detrimental to utility functions [1] as they are based on very simple heuristics such 
as i.i.d. location sampling or sampling locations from a random walk on a grid or between 
points of in- terest. The generated location traces using these types of techniques fail to 
capture the essential semantic and even some basic geographic features. Techniques such as 
spatial cloaking perturb the exact location of the user but do not provide any privacy 
guarantee.  Additionally, they are not resistant to probability based inference attacks [9].  
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Thus, there exists some knowledge gap between these techniques and the desired characteristics 
of a location perturbation mechanism. Differential privacy holds a good reputation in providing a 
privacy guarantee by adding care-      fully calibrated noise which also maintains an acceptable 
level of utility. Geo-indistinguishability proposed in [2], defines a formal notion of privacy for 
location-based systems that protect user’s exact location, while allowing approximate 
information–typically needed to obtain a certain desired service to be released. It formalizes the 
intuitive notion of protecting the userts location within a radius r with a level of privacy l that 
depends on r, and corresponds to a generalized version of the well-known concept of differential 
privacy. The authors in [2] claim that adding Laplace noise, can perturb data effectively. As 
pointed out in [8], the utility of a differentially private mechanism can be increased if some prior 
information is available about the user. Also    in [13], a generic prior distribution π, derived 
from a large user dataset is used to construct   an efficient remap function for increasing the utility 
of the obfuscation algorithm. Clearly, if   we can gather some information about PoI s of a user, it 
can help us to provide a more useful result. However, this information leakage (prior distribution 
available publicly) is useful for the adversary to design his remap function over the output of a 
differentially private mechanism. Therefore, the privacy bounds would require some alteration and 
intuitively, use of Laplace noise might not be an optimal choice.      Now in the next section, we 
state our problem statement. 
 
3 Problem Statement 
In this section, we clearly define the problem statement.    Since  geo  indistinguishability  is  a   flavor  
of  differential  privacy  for  geo  location  data,  it  does  not  take  into  account  various  factors such  
as  (i)  π:   denotes  the  priori  probability  distribution  (prior),  which  is  relative  to  the  user   and 
her knowledge (based on user’s PoI history) [8];  (ii)  ψ:  denotes  the  priori  probability  distribution 
relative to OS’s knowledge about the location of the PoI s, for instance, location of restaurants (=  
PoI )  relative  to  the  current  location.  Since most of the LBS require the user to provide the  ” 
destination location”, (through which OS can determine ψ), this information can      help the OS to 
perturb the  original  location  in  a  biased  way  (towards  the  PoI )  and  therefore maximize  the  
utility  of  the  mechanism.   Clearly, with the knowledge about ψ, we can have a set of linear 
constraints and can use them to determine whether Laplace is still the best choice or   do we need to 
have some new noise distribution. 
In the next sections, we will begin by stating the basics and then will use first principles 
to model various privacy and utility constraints. 
 
4 Our Proposal 
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Figure 1:  1-Dimensional scenario 
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Figure 2:  Probability distribution of output points for query 1 
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Figure 3:  Probability distribution of output points for query 2 
 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have worked on improving the utility of a differentially private mechanism 
for geo-location data. We have used the notion of geo-indistinguishability to provide 
differential privacy guarantee for geo-location data and at the same time, we have used the 
prior information available to the OS about the PoI s in order to improve the utility of the 
mechanism. Through mathematical formulation of the problem and solving the linear system 
of constraints, we have derived the probability distribution of the output points, which can be 
used to add noise to the original input location accordingly. Through our results, it is clear 
that Laplace is not the optimal choice for geo location queries conditioned with a prior and 
with our mechanism we   have strived for maximum utility for 2 queries. We have further 
discussed our future work which lays the trajectory of what we plan to do next in order to 
have an optimum solution for the        real world geo location data.  According to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first paper   which takes prior information about PoI s into 
consideration and maximizes the utility of the geo-location perturbation mechanism while 
providing ρ level of privacy to the user. 
 
 
8  
.∞ 
[6] Srivastava, V. and Naik, V. and Gupta, A.: Privacy Breach of Social Relation from 
Location Based Mobile Applications 
[7] Liao, L. and Fox, D. and Kautz, H.: Extracting places and activities from GPS traces 
using hierarchical conditional random fields 
[8] Brenner, H. and Nissim, K.: Impossibility of Differentially Private Universally Optimal 
Mechanisms 
[9] Nunez, M. and Frignal, J: Geo–Location Inference Attacks: From Modelling to Privacy 
Risk Assessment 
[10]  Gruteser, M. and Grunwald, D.:  Anonymous usage of location–based service through 
spa-    tial  and  temporal cloaking 
[11] Kulik, L. and Duckham, M.:  A formal model of obfuscation and negotiation for location 
privacy 
[12] Ardagna, C.A. and Cremonini, M. and Damiani, E. and Samarati, P.: Location privacy 
protection through obfuscation–based techniques 
[13] Chatzikokolakis, K. and Elsalamouny, E. and Palamidessi, C.: Practical Mechanisms for 
Location Privacy 
[14] ElSalamouny, E. and Gambs, S.: Differential Privacy Models for Location Based 
Services 
 
A Appendix 
The domain D and range R is the x-axis discretized with step δ. Let p be the maximum 
value that should occur at the original location i = (0, 0).  The probability values for output 
points z 
at points ∈  (δ, ∞) are smaller than p but greater than points ∈  (−δ, −∞). 
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